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Solidarity in Overlapping Insurance Coverage: 
Rethinking Hoefly 
Alex Robertson* 
In for a penny, in for a pound—solidary obligors are treated as one. 
As between themselves, a payment to a creditor by one solidary obligor 
relieves the others toward that creditor.1 Interruption of prescription as to 
one solidary obligor interrupts as to all.2 The effects of solidarity are 
powerful and have always been clear, but deciding to whom solidarity 
applies has proven cumbersome for Louisiana courts.3 
A plain reading of the Louisiana Civil Code suggests that solidarity 
arises only when the parties or the law clearly express an intent to bind 
obligors in solido.4 The Louisiana Supreme Court in Hoefly v. Government 
Employees Insurance Company5 established a three-pronged test whereby 
courts could more flexibly invoke the doctrine of solidarity arising from 
the law6 to save a plaintiff’s claim from prescription.7 The Hoefly Court’s 
holding, however—that a victim’s under- or uninsured motorist (“UM”) 
insurer and a tortfeasor were solidarily bound so that prescription was 
interrupted as to both8—perhaps unwittingly expanded the application of 
solidarity.9 
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 1. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1794 (2017).  
 2. Id. art. 3503. 
 3. See generally Bruce Schewe, Tilting Against Windmills: A Solidary 
Rejoinder, 41 LA. L. REV. 1279 (1981) [hereinafter Tilting Against Windmills]. 
 4. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1796. 
 5. 418 So. 2d 575 (La. 1982). 
 6. Id. at 577 (“Under Civil Code Article 2091, ‘[t]here is an obligation in 
solido on the part of the debtors, when they are all obliged to the same thing, so 
that each may be compelled for the whole, and when the payment which is made 
by one of them, exonerates the others toward the creditor.’ When an obligation 
fulfills this definition and contains these ingredients, the obligation is in solido.”).  
 7. See discussion infra Part I.B.3.a. 
 8. Hoefly, 418 So. 2d at 580. 
 9. See discussion infra Part I.C. 
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Although it granted future courts a certain amount of flexibility to 
summon the doctrine of solidarity on an ad hoc basis,10 the Hoefly test 
created unanticipated and perhaps undesirable consequences. Less than a 
year after Hoefly, Justice Blanche criticized the Hoefly Court for 
attempting to “salvage[] a particular plaintiff's claim from prescription by 
invoking the doctrine of solidarity” without considering what other, “less 
palatable effects the application of . . . solidarity would have upon future 
claimants.”11 Blanche’s criticisms foreshadowed a line of tort cases in 
which an insurer’s coverage obligation overlaps with either a tortfeasor or 
another insurer’s liability, sparking litigation over whether parties are 
entitled to a credit for payments made under the policy.12 A study of this 
line of cases reveals that the application of the Hoefly test suffers from 
circular reasoning, irreconcilably conflicts with other Civil Code 
principles and Louisiana Supreme Court jurisprudence, is no longer 
needed to serve the purposes for which Louisiana adopted solidarity, and 
is easily manipulated. 
Part I of this Article analyzes the relevant Louisiana Civil Code 
articles relating to when solidarity should apply, Louisiana courts’ 
interpretations of those articles leading up to Hoefly, and the expansion of 
the Hoefly test in the insurance context. Part II articulates four possible 
defects in the Hoefly test and illustrates each defect with a discussion of 
post-Hoefly jurisprudence. Finally, Part III suggests that courts analyze 
solidarity arising from the law based on a plain reading of the Civil Code, 
requiring the legislature to decide expressly—guided by public policy—
which obligors are solidarily bound. 
I. LOUISIANA’S INTERPRETATION OF SOLIDARITY ARISING FROM THE 
LAW AND ITS APPLICATION IN THE INSURANCE CONTEXT 
Analyzing only the text of the Civil Code articles concerning solidarity 
lends itself to multiple interpretations of when solidarity arises from the law—
that is, situations in which parties have not contracted for a solidary 
relationship. Indeed, Louisiana courts vacillated over the proper interpretation 
until Hoefly established the now-operative three-pronged test. The Hoefly 
decision, however, inadvertently portended the extension of solidarity’s 
application in the insurance “credit cases.” 
                                                                                                             
 10. See SAUL LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS § 7.61, in 5 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW 
TREATISE 142 (2d ed. 2001). 
 11. Carona v. State Farm Ins. Co., 458 So. 2d 1275, 1280 (La. 1984) 
(Blanche, J., concurring). 
 12. See discussion infra Part I.C. 
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A. Basic Civil Code Principles 
A plain reading of the Louisiana Civil Code suggests that solidarity 
arises only from a clear expression in legislation. Articles 1794 and 1796 
address this issue. Of these, only article 1796 speaks directly to when 
solidarity arises.13 Article 1796 articulates two distinct principles: first, 
that solidarity is never presumed; and second, that “[a] solidary obligation 
arises from a clear expression of the parties’ intent or from the law.”14 
Although no Code article delineates the strength of, or what is sufficient 
to overcome, the presumption against solidarity, solidarity is clearly the 
exception rather than the rule.15 Nevertheless, the second principle of 
article 1796—regarding when solidarity “arises”16—suffers from at least 
one major ambiguity. 
Whether the drafters of article 1796 intended the phrase “clear 
expression” to modify only the parties’ intent or both the “parties’ intent” 
and “the law”17 is not apparent. For instance, article 3045 states that co-
sureties are solidarily liable for the obligation of the principal obligor.18 
Such is an obvious example of an unambiguous expression of solidarity in 
the law. Exactly how clear the legislation has to be is uncertain, but it is 
apparent that an obligation may be solidary “though it derives from a 
different source for each obligor.”19 
The Civil Code also distinguishes an obligation that is solidary for 
obligees from an obligation that is solidary for obligors.20 Under article 
1794, styled “Solidary obligations for obligors,” an obligation is solidary 
for obligors “when each obligor is liable for the whole performance.”21 
Article 1794 also states that “[a] performance rendered by one of the 
solidary obligors relieves the others of liability toward the obligee.”22 
Thus, article 1794’s purpose may be accurately described in one of three 
ways: first, by describing only the difference between an obligation that is 
                                                                                                             
 13. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1796 (2017). 
 14. Id. 
 15. See, e.g., Hoefly v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 418 So. 2d 575, 581 (La. 1982) 
(Blanche, J., dissenting). 
 16. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1796. 
 17. See LITVINOFF, supra note 10, § 7.66, at 149. 
 18. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3045. 
 19. Id. art. 1797. 
 20. Id. arts. 1790, 1794. 
 21. Id. art. 1794. 
 22. Id. 
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solidary for the obligors and solidary for the obligees;23 second, by 
describing the effects of solidarity for obligors presupposing a finding of 
solidarity;24 or third, by setting out elements to determine when an 
obligation is solidary for the obligors.25 
Reading both articles 1794 and 1796 in pari materia, it might seem 
that article 1796 determines when solidarity arises from the law. Not only 
does the presumption against solidarity buttress this conclusion, but article 
1796 more specifically addresses when solidarity “arises” from the law.26 
This interpretation would result in fewer obligations being classified as 
solidary, imposing a higher standard when solidarity arises from the law.27  
Another plausible in pari materia interpretation of these articles suggests 
that article 1794—not article 1796—is determinative of solidarity arising 
from the law. Whereas article 1796 speaks of solidarity generally, article 1794 
speaks directly to obligations that are solidary for obligors.28 Indeed, this 
interpretation of article 1794 focuses on the use of “when” in that article and 
interprets what follows as elements or “ingredients”29 of solidarity: “An 
obligation is solidary . . . when . . . .”30 Under this interpretation, it would seem 
that if the conditions are met, the obligation is solidary for the obligors.  
B. Louisiana Courts’ Interpretations of Solidarity Arising from the Law 
Louisiana courts have wavered over what articles to apply to determine 
when solidarity arose from the law. As late as 1981, scholars lamented that 
there was no “ordered doctrine of solidarity,” and few decisions determining 
when solidarity arose from the law “reveal[ed] an adequate theoretical 
foundation.”31 Generally, courts chose one of three options to make that 
determination: first, article 1796’s clear-expression test; second, the 
secondary-effects test; and third, the principal-effects test from article 
                                                                                                             
 23. Compare id. art. 1790 (“Solidary obligations for obligees”), with id. art. 
1794 (“Solidary obligations for obligors”). 
 24. See Bruce Schewe, Prescribing Solidarity: Contributing to the Indemnity 
Dilemma, 41 LA. L. REV. 659, 672–76 (1981) [hereinafter Prescribing Solidarity] 
(discussing the then-operative article 2091, the equivalent of article 1794, and the 
then-operative article 2093, the equivalent of article 1796). 
 25. See, e.g., Hoefly v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Company, 418 So. 2d 575, 577 (La. 1982).  
 26. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1796 (“A solidary obligation arises from a clear 
expression of the parties’ intent or from the law.”). 
 27. LITVINOFF, supra note 10, § 7.66, at 149.  
 28. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1796. 
 29. See Hoefly, 418 So. 2d at 579. 
 30. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1794. 
 31. Prescribing Solidarity, supra note 24, at 679. 
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1794.32 Ultimately, Louisiana courts settled on the principal-effects test, 
which is widely considered to be a liberal interpretation of solidarity.33  
1. The Clear-Expression Test 
When courts applied the “clear-expression” analysis, the only relevant 
inquiry was whether statutory authority expressly prescribed solidarity to 
specific obligors.34 Wary of the presumption against solidarity, courts held 
that the law deemed obligors bound in solido only when a statute or Code 
article spoke to the issue directly.35 For instance, in Cox v. Shreveport 
Packing Co., the Louisiana Supreme Court held an employer and his 
tortfeasing employee were not solidarily bound, stating: “[T]here is no 
provision of our law which expressly renders a master solidarily liable 
with his servant for the latter’s wrongdoing.”36 The clear-expression test 
resulted in fewer obligations being classified as solidary, and courts over 
time slowly backed away from this strict view of solidarity.37 
2. The Secondary-Effects Test 
The secondary-effects test established that solidarity arose from the 
law when the obligation appeared to resemble the secondary effects of 
solidarity.38 This standard seems odd because it developed when the law 
recognized two types of solidarity: imperfect solidarity—also called in 
solidum—and perfect solidarity—also called in solido.39 Similarly, the 
effects of solidarity comprised two subtypes: principal and secondary.40 
Perfect solidarity carried with it both principal and secondary effects, 
while imperfect solidarity carried only the principal effects of solidarity.41 
The Louisiana Civil Code recognized primarily two principal effects of 
solidarity: first, all obligors are “obliged to the same thing so that each 
may be compelled for the whole” obligation; and second, payment made 
                                                                                                             
 32. Id. at 677.  
 33. See Hoefly, 418 So. 2d at 581 (Blanche, J., dissenting) (criticizing the 
principal-effects test as amounting to judicial legislation); see also LITVINOFF, 
supra note 10, § 7.66, at 149.  
 34. See Cox v. Shreveport Packing Co., 35 So. 2d 373, 375 (1948). 
 35. See id. See also Prescribing Solidarity, supra note 24, at 675. 
 36. Cox, 35 So. 2d at 375.  
 37. See LITVINOFF, supra note 10, § 7.66, at 149. 
 38. Tilting Against Windmills, supra note 3, at 1284. 
 39. Id; see LITVINOFF, supra note 10, § 7.101, at 181–82. 
 40. LITVINOFF, supra note 10, § 7.80, at 168.  
 41. Tilting Against Windmills, supra note 3, at 1285. 
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by one obligor exonerated all others toward the creditor.42 This scheme 
recognized that the now-repealed article 2091 set out the principal effects 
of solidarity, and all the articles that followed “specif[ied] [the] secondary 
characteristics of solidarity.”43 The most hotly litigated secondary effect 
of solidarity was that suit against one in solido obligor interrupted 
prescription as to all.44 Other secondary effects of solidarity included: 
putting one solidary obligor in default puts them all in default and shifts 
the risk of loss to the debtors; permitting litigants to sue all solidary 
obligors in any parish that is proper for any solidary obligor; and obligors 
were provided a right of contribution.45 The secondary-effects test, which 
first appeared in the highly criticized Louisiana Supreme Court case 
Wooten v. Wimberly,46 vanished after the Louisiana Supreme Court 
overturned Wooten in Foster v. Hampton, stating, “[t]he distinction drawn 
between perfect and imperfect solidarity is untenable and must be 
rejected.”47 Soon thereafter, the Louisiana Legislature followed suit, 
removing all references to in solidum liability from the Civil Code in the 
1980s.48 
3. The Principal-Effects Test 
The principal-effects test asks whether the principal effects from Civil 
Code article 1796 are present. Under this test, an obligation is solidary 
when all three of the following elements are found: first, all obligors are 
obligated to the same thing; second, each obligor may be compelled for 
the whole; and third, payment made by one exonerates the others toward 
the creditor.49 The Louisiana Supreme Court ultimately settled on this 
test,50 and it continues to remain in effect.51 
Scholars have suggested that this test is a liberal view of solidarity.52 
Despite the Civil Code’s presumption against solidarity and its clear-
expression requirement, Louisiana courts have used this test to conclude 
that obligors are bound in solido, even in the absence of any mention of 
                                                                                                             
 42. Prescribing Solidarity, supra note 24, at 671, n.104. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 672. 
 45. Id. at 672–73. 
 46. 272 So. 2d 303, 305 (La. 1972). 
 47. 381 So. 2d 789, 791 (La. 1980). 
 48. LITVINOFF, supra note 10, § 7.84, at 175. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Hoefly v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 418 So. 2d 575, 577 (La. 1982). 
 51. See discussion infra Part I.C. 
 52. LITVINOFF, supra note 10, § 7.66, at 149. 
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solidarity in the contract or the legislation that bound the parties.53 Put 
another way, “Louisiana courts have adopted a liberal view of solidarity 
that arises from the law, which allows them to conclude that multiple 
obligors are solidarily bound . . . even when the law that provides that 
obligation neither uses the word, nor makes reference to, solidarity.”54 
Perhaps the desirability of solidarity’s principal effects can best explain 
Louisiana courts’ loose applications of solidarity in certain instances. 
a. Liberative Prescription’s Entanglement with Solidarity: 
Interpreting the Result in Hoefly 
Courts adopted this liberal view of solidarity, at least in part, because of 
solidarity’s intertwined relationship with prescription. When prescription is 
interrupted against one solidary obligor, it is interrupted as to all solidary 
obligors.55 This principle is true regardless of whether the plaintiff named 
all of the solidary obligors in the petition or served them.56 Thus, sometimes 
courts stretched the limits of solidarity to help the plaintiff gain access to 
deeper pockets.57 In one such case, Hoefly v. Government Employees 
Insurance Co., the Louisiana Supreme Court adopted a new test for 
solidarity—utilizing the three-pronged principal-effects test—to rescue a 
plaintiff’s claim from prescription.58 Importantly, to arrive at this 
conclusion, the Court had to conclude that a UM insurer and a tortfeasor 
were solidarily bound.59 This aspect of the case unwittingly produced 
unforeseen consequences in tort cases in which tortfeasors or insurers had 
overlapping liability.60 
Justice Blanche dissented in Hoefly, sharply criticizing the majority.61 
Specifically, he noted that “[i]n all other cases in which legal solidarity 
arises, there exists some relationship between the parties who are held 
solidarily liable.”62 Reasoning that because “the law” did not create any 
                                                                                                             
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3503 (2017). 
 56. See id. art. 3503 cmt. b. 
 57. See, e.g., Carona v. State Farm Ins. Co., 458 So. 2d 1275, 1280 (La. 1984) 
(“In Hoefly v. GEICO, this Court salvaged a particular plaintiff's claim from 
prescription by invoking the doctrine of solidarity whereby U/M insurers were 
deemed solidarily liable with tortfeasors.” (citation omitted)).  
 58. Hoefly v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 418 So. 2d 575, 576 (La. 1982). 
 59. Id. at 579. 
 60. See discussion infra Part II. 
 61. Hoefly, 418 So. 2d at 581 (Blanche, J., dissenting). 
 62. Id.  
982 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77 
 
 
 
relationship between the tortfeasors and the UM insurer, the application of 
solidarity in Hoefly was “purely [a] creation of the majority.”63 Blanche 
buttressed his criticisms with the presumption against solidarity, stating, 
“we cannot presume a solidary relationship where none is intended to 
exist.”64 Thus, according to Blanche, there must be, at the very least, some 
legislative intent to bind obligors solidarily, even if the legislature did not 
say it outright.65 Anything else, in his opinion, amounted to “judicial 
legislation.”66 
b. Immediate Fallout from Hoefly: Justice Blanche’s Concurrence in 
Carona 
The unanticipated consequences of Hoefly manifested almost immediately. 
A year after Hoefly, in Carona v. State Farm Insurance Co.,67 the Louisiana 
Supreme Court dealt with a group of consolidated cases in which the trial court 
in each case either granted summary judgment or granted an exception of res 
judicata in favor of UM carriers because the tort victims settled with the 
tortfeasors without expressly reserving rights against the UM carriers.68 
The then-operative Civil Code article 2203 provided that when an obligee 
remitted a debt against one solidary obligor without expressly reserving 
rights against the other, the obligee forfeited the entire obligation.69 Hence, 
the Court faced what was perhaps an unforeseen implication from the 
Hoefly holding, which had previously held that a UM provider and the 
tortfeasor were solidary obligors.70 Eschewing the “technical rule” of 
article 2203, the Court, in a feat of interpretive acrobatics, concluded that 
the purpose of UM legislation precluded article 2203’s application in that 
case.71 
The Court unanimously agreed with the result in Carona.72 Concurring 
in the result only, Justice Blanche seized an opportunity to reassert and expand 
upon his dissent in Hoefly.73 Specifically, he characterized the reasoning in 
Hoefly as nothing more than “salvag[ing] a particular plaintiff’s claim from 
                                                                                                             
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. 458 So. 2d 1275 (La. 1984). 
 68. Id. at 1277. 
 69. Id.  
 70. Hoefly, 418 So. 2d at 580. 
 71. Carona, 458 So. 2d at 1279. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 1280. 
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prescription by invoking the doctrine of solidarity.”74 According to Justice 
Blanche, Carona was an example of the “less palatable effects” caused by 
the Court’s loose interpretation in Hoefly.75 
Blanche premised his reasoning on the notion “that no solidary 
relationship exists between a tortfeasor and the claimant’s U/M carrier.”76 
Therefore, it was the blind assertion of Hoefly at the root of the issues in 
Carona.77 Blanche, however, did not necessarily disagree with the use of 
the principal-effects test per se, but rather the Court’s analysis of whether 
obligors are “all obliged to the same thing.”78 
Blanche then set out a new method to interpret when obligors are 
“obliged to the same thing.”79 Under Blanche’s test, solidarity would seem 
to arise between insurers only when expressly legislated or when the 
insurers had previously enjoyed a “solidary relationship” with one 
another.80 Premising his reasoning on the assertion that solidarity is an 
exception to the general rule, under which debts are divided among joint 
obligors, Blanche noted that the UM statute “contains no provision which 
would allow the U/M carrier” to become solidarily liable with a 
tortfeasor.81 The lack of legislation prescribing solidarity coupled with the 
presumption against solidarity, militated against the Court cobbling 
together a solidary obligation from different areas of the law.82  
Blanche also balked at the notion that it is the coextensiveness of the 
obligations that makes obligors bound for the same thing.83 Instead, 
Blanche preferred the French rule: a plaintiff may look to any solidary 
obligor for the whole obligation.84 Expanding upon the definition of 
“whole obligation,” Blanche clarified that in France, obligors are 
solidarily bound only if the entirety of their obligation is the same 
amount.85 Thus, under the majority approach, if two obligors are bound 
for “the same thing”—one for up to $50,000 and one for $75,000—the two 
are solidarily bound for the $50,000.86 Under Blanche’s rationale, 
                                                                                                             
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 1281. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 1282. 
 81. Id.  
 82. See id. at 1282–83.  
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. See id. 
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however, the two cannot be solidarily bound at all because they are not 
bound for the “same thing.”87 Followed to its logical conclusion, unless 
the amount of the plaintiff’s damages and the policy limits are the exact 
equivalent, the law would most likely never bind an insurer and a 
tortfeasor in solido.88  
C. The Expansion of the Three-Pronged Hoefly Test in the Context of 
Insurance 
Since Hoefly, solidarity has been a hotly litigated issue in “credit 
cases.”89 In those cases, an accident occurs, usually during the course and 
scope of employment, and two or more insurers have provided coverage.90 
After one of the insurers pays first,91 the other insurer, recognizing that the 
plaintiff has already received a payment, files a motion for summary 
judgment seeking recognition of a credit reducing its obligation by the 
amount the other insurer has already paid.92 The operative theory is that 
the two insurers are solidary obligors, and payment by one exonerates the 
other toward the creditor.93 The two Louisiana Supreme Court cases that 
embraced the application of solidarity in this context—Bellard and 
Cutsinger—have made it worthwhile for many insurers to litigate this 
issue. Indeed, after Bellard and Cutsinger many appellate courts have 
examined solidarity in similar situations, resulting in an incoherent and 
confused body of jurisprudence.94 
1. Bellard and Cutsinger: Expanding Solidarity in Insurance Cases 
In Bellard v. American Central Insurance Co.,95 the Louisiana Supreme 
Court held that the UM insurer of a plaintiff’s employer was entitled to a credit 
in the amount paid by the employer’s workers’ compensation insurer because 
the two were solidarily bound.96 In that case, an employee sustained injuries 
                                                                                                             
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 1283. 
 89. See Musa Rahman, Bellard & Cutsinger: A Review of the Supreme Court 
Cases and Their Potential Fallout in Workers’ Compensation, 58 LA. B.J. 374, 
375 (2011). 
 90. See, e.g., Bellard v. Am. Cent. Ins. Co., 980 So. 2d 654, 660 (La. 2008). 
 91. See, e.g., id. 
 92. See, e.g., id. 
 93. See, e.g., id. 
 94. See discussion infra Part II.C.2. 
 95. Bellard, 980 So. 2d at 654. 
 96. Id. at 671.  
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in a moving vehicle accident during the course and scope of his 
employment.97 The plaintiff sued the other driver’s liability insurer, the 
other driver, and his employer’s UM insurer.98 The employer’s UM insurer 
then filed a motion for summary judgment seeking a declaration that the 
insurer was entitled to a credit in the amount that workers’ compensation 
paid to the plaintiff.99 
In holding that the UM insurer was entitled to the credit, the Court first 
concluded that the UM insurer and the workers’ compensation carrier were 
solidary obligors.100 Applying the three-pronged Hoefly test, the Court 
determined that each insurer was liable for the same thing: “certain 
elements of tort damage.”101 Accordingly, it did not matter that different 
areas of the law created liability and that no legislation expressed an intent 
to bind the obligors in solido.102 Next, the Court determined that both 
obligors “may be compelled for the whole of their common liability” 
because neither was subject to a plea of division.103 Last, the Court 
concluded that payment from one exonerated the other because an “injured 
employee is not allowed to obtain double recovery on those elements of 
damage which are coextensive.”104  
Thus, the two insurers were solidary obligors.105 Because solidarity 
existed, payment by the workers’ compensation insurer exonerated the 
UM insurer toward the plaintiff.106 After concluding that the collateral-
source rule did not apply,107 the Court held that the UM insurer was 
entitled to a credit in the amount paid by workers’ compensation.108 
After Bellard held that the employer’s UM carrier could receive a 
credit for payments by the workers’ compensation insurer, the Louisiana 
Supreme Court added that the same applies for the plaintiff’s UM 
                                                                                                             
 97. Id. at 659–60. 
 98. Id. at 660. 
 99. Id. at 661. 
 100. Id. at 667. 
 101. Id. at 664. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 665. 
 104. Id. at 666. 
 105. Id. at 667. 
 106. Id. at 666. 
 107. Id. at 671. The collateral-source rule is a common law import. Id. at 667. 
“Basically, the rule provides that ‘a tortfeasor may not benefit, and an injured 
plaintiff’s tort recovery may not be reduced, because of monies received by the 
plaintiff from sources independent of the tortfeasor’s procuration or contribution.’” Id. 
(citing Bozeman v. Louisiana, 879 So. 2d 692, 698 (La. 2004)). 
 108. Id.  
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insurer.109 That case—Cutsinger v. Redfern—had facts that were nearly 
identical to Bellard.110 One major difference, however, was that the UM 
policy excluded coverage to the extent that coverage would benefit any 
workers’ compensation insurer.111 The Court first noted that this 
“Traveler’s exclusion” was enforceable under previous Louisiana 
Supreme Court jurisprudence.112 The Court then reasoned that “[t]he fact 
that the uninsured motorist coverage was procured by plaintiff in this case 
rather than her employer as was the case in Bellard makes no difference 
in the solidarity analysis.”113 In keeping with Bellard, the Court went on 
to analyze solidarity and concluded that the two were solidarily bound.114 
Thus, once again, the UM insurer was entitled to a credit.115 
2. Cole v. State Farm: Backing Off of Bellard and Cutsinger 
In Cole v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,116 the Third 
Circuit addressed facts that were similar to those in Cutsinger and Bellard, 
but with two major differences: first, the workers’ compensation insurer 
sought the credit from the UM insurer;117 and second, the relevant UM 
policy contained a Traveler’s exclusion.118 The crux of the workers’ 
compensation insurer’s argument was that because the Louisiana Supreme 
Court jurisprudence made clear that the two parties were solidarily bound, 
basic Civil Code principles of solidarity required that either party should 
be allowed a credit.119 Ultimately, the court held that the workers’ 
compensation insurer was not entitled to the credit.120 The court arrived at 
that decision not through an analysis of solidarity, but rather by reasoning 
that the policy language excluding UM coverage to the extent it benefits 
the workers’ compensation insurer precludes the insurer from claiming a 
credit.121 
                                                                                                             
 109. Cutsinger v. Redfern, 12 So. 3d 945, 955 (La. 2009). 
 110. See generally id.  
 111. Id. at 954. 
 112. Id. (quoting Travelers Ins. Co. v. Joseph, 656 So. 2d 1000, 1004 (La. 
1995)) (“[N]o statutory provision or policy consideration precludes a UM carrier 
from contracting to exclude liability for compensation reimbursement.”). 
 113. Id. at 951–52. 
 114. Id. at 953. 
 115. Id. at 956. 
 116. 149 So. 3d 831 (La. Ct. App. 2014). 
 117. Id. at 832. 
 118. Id. at 834–35. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 836. 
 121. Id. 
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The Cole court almost entirely sidestepped the issue of solidarity, 
stating only that “solidarity can be affected by contract.”122 Supporting its 
decision to decide the case on policy grounds, the court cited a slew of pre-
Bellard cases upholding the Traveler’s exclusion.123 After Bellard and 
Cutsinger, however, it is strange to see a lower court decide a “credit case” 
without properly analyzing solidarity. 
3. Olivier v. City of Eunice, Advantage Personnel, and Being 
“Bound for the Same Thing” 
A court’s finding of whether two obligors are bound for the same thing 
may be contingent on how specifically the court chooses to describe the 
obligation. In Olivier v. City of Eunice,124 the Third Circuit held that an 
employer and an employee’s health insurer were bound in solido for 
injuries the plaintiff sustained during his employment.125 In applying the 
first prong of the Hoefly test, the court determined that both obligors were 
bound for the same thing because they shared a similar purpose—to 
compensate injured and ill persons.126 The court concluded that the 
remaining two prongs of the Hoefly test were met without offering any 
analysis.127 The court also noted in its opinion that the analysis was made 
without having a copy of any insurance policy in the record.128 
The Olivier court employed a high level of generality to describe the 
obligations between two obligors to find solidarity. In contrast, however, 
the First Circuit in Advantage Personnel and Louisiana Safety Ass’n of 
Timbermen v. Van Cleave129 described two obligations with a high level 
of specificity to find that two obligors were not solidarily bound.130 In 
deciding that a workers’ compensation insurer and UM insurer were not 
solidarily bound, the Advantage Personnel court concluded that the 
workers’ compensation insurer’s obligation could not include loss of 
consortium and pain because workers’ compensation does not compensate 
for those damages.131 
                                                                                                             
 122. Id. at 835 (quoting Watson v. Funderburk, 720 So. 2d 808 (La. Ct. App. 
1998), writ denied, 736 So. 2d 834 (La. 1999)). 
 123. Id. at 833. 
 124. 92 So. 3d 630 (La. Ct. App. 2012). 
 125. Id. at 641. 
 126. Id. at 639. 
 127. Id. at 639–40. 
 128. Id. at 638. 
 129. 146 So. 3d 221 (La. Ct. App. 2014). 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 233. 
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II. POSSIBLE DEFICIENCIES IN THE HOEFLY TEST 
The propriety and effectiveness of the Hoefly test as a means of 
determining solidarity that “arises from the law” is questionable. In 
Fertitta v. Allstate,132 Louisiana’s highest court addressed the difficulty of 
using a test where the elements of the test cannot be parsed from the 
consequences of the test: 
Perhaps the most difficult problem in solidarity cases is separating 
conceptually the requirements of solidarity from the consequences of 
solidarity. [The Louisiana Civil Code] set[s] forth the requirement of 
solidarity that the debtors are obliged to the same thing in that each is 
separately bound to perform the whole of the obligation. . . . In cases 
in which solidarity results from a contract . . . the determination of 
solidarity is relatively simple . . . . The difficult cases are those in 
which solidarity is imposed by law on two parties with different 
sources of liability, and there is a tendency to determine the existence 
of solidarity by inquiring whether the consequences of solidarity 
should flow from the relationship between the parties. . . . While this 
may be a legitimate inquiry into whether the Legislature intended the 
consequences of solidarity, discussion of the consequences as part of 
the determination of the existence of solidarity has been confusing in 
judicial decisions.133 
Accordingly, this Section proceeds by examining post-Hoefly 
jurisprudence as a means of evaluating the efficacy of the Hoefly test. A 
review of this line of cases reveals that the Hoefly test suffers from a circular 
analytical framework; is incompatible with previous Louisiana Supreme 
Court jurisprudence; fails to serve solidarity’s original purpose; and is easily 
manipulated. 
A. A Circular Analytical Framework 
Dissecting the analytical framework of the line of “credit” cases 
reveals the circular nature of a consequences-based test. The application 
of a consequences-based test has always been troublesome for Louisiana 
courts, as evidenced by the dicta in Fertitta.134 What the Fertitta Court 
                                                                                                             
 132. 462 So. 2d 159 (La. 1985). 
 133. Id. at 163 n.5. Justice Blanche concurred in Fertitta. In his concurrence, 
he only referred the reader to his dissent in Hoefly and his concurrence in Carona. 
Id. at 165. 
 134. Id. at 163 n.5. 
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struggled to articulate is that the Hoefly test itself suffers from a circular 
analytical framework. Circular reasoning is defined as “a type of reasoning 
in which the proposition is supported by the premises, which is supported 
by the proposition.”135 This definition makes more sense in an illustration: 
X is true because of Y, and Y is true because of X.136 A logical statement 
could be similarly illustrated: X is true because of Y, and Y is true because 
of Z.137 
The third prong of the Hoefly test determines solidarity in part by 
asking whether payment by one exonerates the others toward the 
creditor.138 In the credit cases, the entire purpose of determining solidarity 
was to determine if payment by one insurer exonerated the other insurer 
as to the plaintiff.139 For instance, in Bellard, the Court determined that 
because “payment by one exonerated the other” (X) they were solidarily 
bound (Y). Thus, because they were solidarily bound (Y), payment by one 
exonerated the other as toward the creditor (X).140 This classic illustration 
of circular reasoning indicates that using a consequences-based test to 
determine the classification of an obligation is erroneous because the 
classification is important only because of its consequences. This flawed 
framework implies that the Hoefly Court incorrectly applied article 1796 
as the basis for its solidarity test. 
Thus, to cure the logical defect of the Hoefly test, the criteria for 
determining solidarity must be distinct from the consequences of 
solidarity. This distinction must exist because the end result is often, as 
illustrated in the insurance-credit cases,141 an application of the 
consequences of solidarity. In other words, as long as there is a 
consequences-based test, the test will always be circular. 
B. The Problems Presented by the Traveler’s Exclusion 
In addition to, or perhaps because of, the logical deficiencies of the 
Hoefly test, courts have exhibited confusion in applying solidarity in the 
                                                                                                             
 135. Circular Reasoning, LOGICALLY FALLACIOUS, https://www.logicallyfalla 
cious.com/tools/lp/Bo/LogicalFallacies/66/Circular_Reasoning [https://perma.cc/C 
4D7-Q387] (last visited Jan. 23, 2017). 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Hoefly v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 418 So. 2d 575, 576 (La. 1982). 
 139. See discussion supra Part I.C. 
 140. Bellard v. Am. Cent. Ins. Co., 980 So. 2d 654, 666 (La. 2008). 
 141. See discussion supra Part I.C. 
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insurance context.142 Specifically, problems arise when a UM policy 
contains a provision excluding coverage to the extent it benefits any 
workers’ compensation insurance company.143 Longstanding Louisiana 
jurisprudence upholds these exclusions under Traveler’s, yet upholding 
the exclusion runs afoul of solidarity principles. 
The reasoning in Cole v. State Farm clearly illustrates this point. 
Recall that this case dealt with facts similar to Bellard and Cutsinger—a 
tort victim sustained injuries in a car accident during the course and scope 
of employment.144 Although Bellard premised its decisions on 
solidarity,145 Cole anchored its decision in terms of the language of the 
applicable insurance policy.146 Curiously, Cole did not apply the Hoefly 
test. Rather, the court stated only that “solidarity [can] be affected by 
contract” as support for deciding the issue on policy grounds.147 
This statement of law—most likely because of citation error—seems 
to lack supporting legal authority. The court cited Watson, and Watson 
cited Fertitta, for this proposition.148 The applicable portion of Fertitta that 
found its way into Cole, however, stood only for the proposition that one 
solidary obligor cannot contract with the creditor as to the effect that its 
payment would have concerning the exoneration of other solidary obligors 
toward the creditor.149 No such circumstances existed in Cole. 
Citation errors aside, perhaps the Cole court struggled to reconcile the 
operation of a Traveler’s exclusion, which excludes UM coverage to the 
extent it benefits any workers’ compensation insurance company, with the 
principles of solidarity. Under Bellard and Cutsinger, the UM insurer and 
the workers’ compensation insurer are solidarily bound.150 Therefore, 
                                                                                                             
 142. See, e.g., Cole v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 149 So. 3d 831, 833, 
836 (La. Ct. App. 2014); see also discussion infra Part II.B. 
 143. See id. 
 144. See Bellard, 980 So. 2d at 656; see also Cutsinger v. Redfern, 12 So. 3d 
945, 946 (La. 2009); Cole, 149 So. 3d at 833, 836. 
 145. Bellard, 980 So. 2d at 672. 
 146. Cole, 149 So. 3d at 833, 836. 
 147. Id. at 835 (quoting Watson v. Funderburk, 720 So. 2d 808, 810 (La. Ct. 
App. 1998)). 
 148. Id. 
 149. Fertitta v. Allstate Ins. Co., 462 So. 2d 159, 164 (La. 1985) 
(“Nevertheless, the Civil Code expressly provides that payment by one solidary 
obligor exonerates the other toward the creditor to the extent of that payment, and 
the solidary obligor who makes the payment cannot by agreement with the 
creditor affect the right of the other solidary obligor to exoneration to the extent 
of the payment.”).  
 150. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1796 (2017); see also Bellard, 980 So. 2d at 667; 
Cutsinger, 12 So. 3d at 952. 
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under article 1796, payment by either should exonerate the other toward 
the creditor, and the workers’ compensation insurer should have been 
entitled to a credit.151 If the Cole court applied the rules of solidarity, 
however, the application of those rules would have run afoul of Traveler’s 
because it effectively renders the policy exclusion unenforceable by 
allowing the workers’ compensation insurer to benefit from the UM 
insurer’s payment. 
It seems that the operation of the Traveler’s exclusion precludes a 
finding of solidarity. Therefore, the Louisiana Supreme Court in Cutsinger 
failed to make a distinction between a UM policy that has a Traveler’s 
exclusion and one that does not. The Louisiana Supreme Court has long 
stated that it is the coextensiveness of the obligations that bind obligors in 
solido.152 And arguably, a UM policy containing a workers’ compensation 
exclusion is not bound coextensively at all with a workers’ compensation 
insurer. If the total liability triggering both policies never exceeds the 
amount paid by workers’ compensation, the UM insurer owes nothing. In 
this light, the UM insurer is bound only to the extent that the workers’ 
compensation insurer is not.  
C. The Test No Longer Serves its Original Purpose 
Many scholars suggest it was misguided to adopt such a liberal view 
of solidarity arising from the law, and a plain reading of the Code forced 
the courts’ hands to avoid harsh results following from a strict application 
of solidarity.153 Thus, an expansive view of solidarity arising from the law 
was necessary to promote tort recovery and the free flow of credit, which 
are the reasons Louisiana instituted solidarity.154 A liberal view of 
solidarity—such as the Hoefly test—is no longer necessary address those 
concerns, however. 
One way that solidarity promoted tort recovery—a reason that likely 
influenced the Court’s decision in Hoefly—was the entanglement of 
solidarity with liberative prescription. The Court in Hoefly needed to find 
solidarity to save a plaintiff’s claim.155 The 1988 revision to Civil Code 
article 2324 adding that interruption of prescription as to one joint 
                                                                                                             
 151. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1796; see also Bellard, 980 So. 2d at 667; Cutsinger, 
12 So. 3d at 952. 
 152. Narcise v. Ill. Cent. Gulf R.R. Co., 427 So. 2d 1192, 1195 (La. 1983). 
 153. See, e.g., Patricia Wiener, Obligations—Uninsured Motorist and Insurer 
as Obligors In Solido, 58 TUL. L. REV. 642, 658–59 (1983). 
 154. LITVINOFF, supra note 10, § 7.66, at 149. 
 155. Hoefly v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 418 So. 2d 575, 576 (La. 1982). 
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tortfeasor interrupts as to others,156 however, diminished the need for 
solidarity to aid in tort recovery. 
Similarly, a broad interpretation of solidarity arising from the law is 
not needed to facilitate the free flow of credit. The law presumes that 
creditors are generally sophisticated and are capable of contracting for 
solidarity.157 The lobby for creditors—such as banks—is persuasive 
enough that now, the most prolific source of solidarity in legislation can 
be found in the law of negotiable instruments.158 Insurers can also avail 
themselves of policy exclusions such as the Traveler’s exclusion that was 
dispositive in Cole. 
D. Prong One of the Hoefly Test is Easily Manipulated 
The first prong of the principal-effects test, which asks whether each 
obligor is obligated for the same thing, is also flawed. In constitutional 
law, ample literature discusses the concept referred to as “levels of 
generality.”159 Simply put, the more generally a court describes two things, 
the more similar those two things appear.160 Conversely, the more 
specifically two things are described, the more different they appear.161 
Courts, perhaps unwittingly, use this technique to manipulate the Hoefly 
test. 
                                                                                                             
 156. Act No. 430, 1988 La. Acts 932. 
 157. See Sec. First Nat’l Bank v. Murchison, 739 So. 2d 803, 807 (La. Ct. App. 
1999); see also GLENN G. MORRIS & WENDELL H. HOLMES, BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATIONS § 33.03, in 8 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 104 (1999). 
 158. See LA. REV. STAT. §§ 10:1-101 to 10:1-103, 10:3-112, 10:3-114, 10:3-
116, 10:3-413 to 10:3-415, 10:3-417 (2017); see also LITVINOFF, supra note 10, § 
7.66, at 149 (“Be that as it may, legal solidarity does not arise only from articles 
in the civil code. Among the other laws that address the same subject, the most 
prolific source of solidarity for multiple obligors is, perhaps, the law of negotiable 
instruments.”). 
 159. See Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the 
Definition of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057, 1058 (1990) (“The question then 
becomes: at what level of generality should the Court describe the right 
previously protected and the right currently claimed? The more abstractly one 
states the already-protected right, the more likely it becomes that the claimed right 
will fall within its protection. For instance, did the Court in Griswold v. 
Connecticut recognize the narrow right to use contraception or the broader right 
to make a variety of procreative decisions? Obviously, the descriptive choice will 
affect the Court’s decisions in other cases, such as those involving abortion.”). 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
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For instance, in Olivier v. City of Eunice,162 without having the 
insurance policies on record, the Third Circuit held that a workers’ 
compensation insurer and a health insurance provider were solidarily 
liable.163 The court, utilizing a high level of generality, concluded that the 
“general purpose” of both types of coverage were the same; thus both were 
bound for the same thing.164 In Advantage Personnel v. Van Cleave, the 
First Circuit concluded that a workers’ compensation insurer was not 
solidarily liable with a liability insurer for the plaintiff’s loss of consortium 
and pain and suffering damages.165 Utilizing a high level of specificity, the 
court described the workers’ compensation obligation as only including 
compensation for medical bills and lost wages—not loss of consortium or 
pain and suffering.166 The court concluded that the liability insurer’s 
obligation did include compensation for loss of consortium and pain and 
suffering.167 Therefore, the two insurers were not obligated for the same 
thing.168 Compared to the Louisiana Supreme Court’s description of a 
workers’ compensation insurer’s obligation as for “certain elements of tort 
damage,”169 it is easy to see how the manipulation of levels of generality 
used to describe an obligation can influence a court’s analysis of the first 
prong of the Hoefly test. A more cynical view of this technique’s 
application might lead the reader to conclude that it allows a court to reach 
                                                                                                             
 162. 92 So. 3d 630 (La. Ct. App. 2012). 
 163. Id. at 639.  
 164. Id. (“In Bellard and Cutsinger, the obligations of UM insurers and 
workers’ compensation insurers were at issue, and to the extent that their 
obligations to the plaintiff employees overlapped, they were found to be obliged 
for the same thing. The obligations of health insurers and employers or workers’ 
compensation insurers are similar to, but not the same as, those of UM insurers 
and workers’ compensation insurers. The central purpose of workers’ 
compensation insurance and health insurance is protection of an injured or ill 
person. The WCA protects the person when his injury or illness is related to his 
employment. Health insurance protects the person in all situations when he is 
injured or ill. For these reasons, we find the City and Blue Cross are obliged for 
the same thing.”).  
 165. 146 So. 3d 221, 231 (La. Ct. App. 2014). 
 166. Id. at 233. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. (“The workers’ compensation insurer and UM insurer are solidary 
obligors only to the extent that their obligations are co-extensive for lost wages 
and medical expenses . . . . The insurers are not solidary obligors for other 
damages, such as pain and suffering or loss of consortium, because the workers’ 
compensation insurer has no liability for those damages under the exclusive 
remedy provision of the workers' compensation act.”). 
 169. Bellard v. Am. Cent. Ins. Co., 980 So. 2d 654, 664 (La. 2008). 
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any conclusion it desires. Perhaps this illustration of the Hoefly test’s 
malleability is what Justice Blanche had in mind when he characterized 
the Hoefly test as “judicial legislation.”170 
III. A SIMPLE SOLUTION—RETURNING TO BASIC 
CIVIL CODE PRINCIPLES 
The doctrine surrounding the determination of solidarity arising from 
the law has become untenable in Louisiana. And this particular issue is not 
peculiar to Louisiana. In fact, the Louisiana Civil Law Treatise recognizes 
that, faced with analogous problems,171 French courts have turned to 
solidarité coutumière or “solidarity custom.”172 There, the courts ask if 
two particular obligors have been historically treated as solidary.173 Other 
Civil Code principles, however, may also provide guidance. 
Louisiana should return to a test for solidarity that recognizes, as 
Justice Blanche did, that solidarity is an exception to the general rule.174 
The general rule should remain what the drafters of the Code intended: 
except where parties contract for solidarity, it should arise only from a 
clear expression from legislation. As Justice Blanche noted, whether 
solidarity has arisen from the law is an issue of legislative intent that must 
be viewed in light of the presumption against solidarity.175 
There may be unforeseeable instances that call for an exception. In 
such a rare case, an exception must be applied only in light of the purposes 
for which France and Louisiana have adopted solidarity: tort recovery and 
the flow of credit.176 As an additional restriction on this exception to the 
general rule, courts may adopt France’s solution by testing for whether the 
two obligors have been treated as solidary.177 That is, there must “exist[] 
                                                                                                             
 170. See Hoefly v. Gov’t Emp. Ins. Co., 418 So. 2d 575, 581 (La. 1982) 
(Blanche, J., dissenting) (“A solidary relationship between the uninsured motorist 
carrier and the tortfeasor does not exist by virtue of some provision of the law; 
rather, it is purely the creation of the majority opinion. Such judicial legislation is 
beyond the bounds of our authority. By the express provisions of C.C. art. 2093, 
we cannot presume a solidary relationship where none is intended to exist.”). 
 171. LITVINOFF, supra note 10, § 7.66, at 149. 
 172. 7 MARCEL PLANIOL & GEORGES RIPERT, TRAITÉ PRATIQUE DE DROIT 
CIVIL FRANÇAIS 430–33 (2d ed. 1954). 
 173. Id. 
 174. See Carona v. State Farm. Ins. Co., 458 So. 2d 1275, 1280 (La. 1984) 
(Blanche, J., concurring). 
 175. Hoefly, 418 So. 2d at 581 (Blanche, J., dissenting). 
 176. LITVINOFF, supra note 10, § 7.66, at 149. 
 177. PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra note 172, at 430–33. 
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some relationship between the parties who are held solidarily liable.”178 In 
addition to comporting with an everyday common sense notion of fairness, 
this test aligns itself with the most basic of Civil Code principles. This 
notion of custom, though seldom applied, is the most basic of civilian 
principles derived from the Civil Code’s first article: “The sources of law 
are legislation and custom.”179 Embedded in this inquiry of custom—
which asks if the obligors have traditionally been treated as solidary—is 
the concept of the “relationship” that concerned Justice Blanche. Whether 
from contract or legislation, a solidary relationship cannot be presumed 
where none was intended to exist.180 
CONCLUSION 
Louisiana courts must return to a more restrained view of solidarity 
arising from the law. The Hoefly test as illustrated in the context of 
overlapping insurance coverage cases is simply no longer tenable. Indeed, 
it may be that it never was. As the Hoefly test has expanded, Justice 
Blanche’s emphatic dissent in Hoefly now seems prophetic: solidarity is a 
legal relationship best prescribed by the legislature. When legislated, the 
results would be predictable, and defendants in tort suits would be put on 
notice of the existence of their relationship to one another. In the rare 
instances where courts may apply an exception, the use of this exception 
should be restrained by the public policy goals of tort recovery and flow 
of credit and should only be applied where the obligors have historically 
been treated as solidary. 
 
                                                                                                             
 178. Hoefly, 418 So. 2d at 581 (Blanche, J., dissenting). 
 179. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1 (2017). 
 180. Hoefly, 418 So. 2d at 581 (Blanche, J., dissenting). 
